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Introduction 
This paper will describe the authors’ efforts to model the financial operations and organizational 
behavior of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French initials, GSPC), 
using Stella® version 9.0, a commercially-available system dynamics software package. The 
model aggregates empirical knowledge and collective expert opinion on the GSPC financial 
subsystem into a single cognitive tool.[1] Using the model for exploratory analysis suggests 
answers to questions such as how funding affects the quantity and type of GSPC operations, how 
the financial and operational aspects of the organization change over its life cycle, and what 
policymakers should expect next from the GSPC. Finally, the model allows users to see the full 
range of effects from different policy choices, including effects policymakers may not intend.  
Complex systems defy analysis through normal cognitive methods. As such, modeling is an ideal 
heuristic to further understanding of these systems.[2] Unfortunately, prior modeling of terrorist 
organizations is limited. Joshua M. Epstein, John D. Steinbruner, and Miles T. Parker from the 
Center on Social and Economic Dynamics previously built a model of civil violence utilizing an 
agent-based approach.[3] The systems dynamics approach to terrorism evolved from work done 
by the RAND Corporation on deterring and influencing al Qaeda.[4] Building on the RAND 
Corporation’s efforts, Air Force officers Troy Thomas, Steven D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer 
developed a methodology for analyzing violent non-state actors (VNSA) based on open-systems 
theory.[5] Casebeer and Thomas later collaborated with Jason Bartolomei to apply their 
methodology to Peru’s Sendero Luminoso, developing a system dynamics model of Sendero’s 
recruitment sub-system.[6] Prior modeling specific to terrorist financing is virtually non-existent. 
The notable exception is Steve Kiser, who used a linear programming methodology to model al 
Qaeda’s financial support structure.[7] 
The GSPC Financial Subsystem  
The GSPC financial subsystem consists of a series of funding streams into and out of the 
organization. Incoming funding includes revenues generated from extortions, donations, 
smuggling, business fronts, kidnappings, and external support. Outgoing funds pay for overhead 
costs and operational expenses. Complicating efforts to model the GPSC financial subsystem 
was the requirement to replicate its functions in both North Africa and Europe. Although the group 
historically confined its operations to Algeria, today it appears to be expanding throughout North 
Africa.[8] Additionally, the GSPC has reportedly “taken over the GIA’s external networks across 
Europe.”[9] In September 2003, the group’s leader declared allegiance to al Qaeda.[10] 
Notably, GSPC operations show little correlation to the group’s membership numbers. After 
Hassan Hattab led a group of around seven-hundred Islamists out of the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) to form the GSPC sometime between 1996 and 1998,[11] the organization rapidly grew in 
strength. By 2002, it had approximately four thousand members.[12] Since then, however, GSPC 
membership has declined to somewhere between three-hundred and five-hundred fighters.[13] 
Despite this drastic decline in membership, the GSPC’s violent activity shows no signs of letting 
up. Figure 1 charts the GSPC’s estimated strength and quantity of operations by year, revealing 
that 2005 was the second most active year in the organization’s history despite a massive drop in 
membership numbers.  
Figure 1: GSPC Membership vs. Quantity of Operations 
 
Although counterintuitive, the lack of correlation between membership and operations comports 
with existing theories of guerrilla warfare.[14] This simplified the model of the GSPC financial 
subsystem, allowing it to discount organizational membership and focus exclusively on resources 
and operations. The model uses a political economy framework to link these two organizational 
facets. Since terrorist “funding sources can shape the behavior of terrorist groups,”[15] this 
framework can illuminate not only how the financial subsystem reacts to its environment, but also 
how it affects the output of the GSPC's operations.  
Subsystem Causality  
To better understand the interactions within this highly complex subsystem, the authors built a 
series of causal loop diagrams depicting resource inflows, resource outflows, and European 
operations. Figure 2 shows the basic causal loop for the GSPC financial subsystem, the 
“resources-operations” loop, using standard systems dynamics conventions. Arrows between two 
variables indicate a causal relationship. The “s” or “o” next to each arrowhead denotes whether 
the connected variables move in the same or opposite directions. Thus, the diagram in Figure 2 
denotes that an increase in GSPC resources leads to an increase in overhead and operations 
expenses. Conversely, increased overhead and operational expenses decrease the GSPC’s 
overall resources. 
Figure 2: Resources-Operations Loop 
 
While the causal loop in Figure 2 shows the basic relationship between the GSPC resource pool 
and its expenses, it neglects how the organization replenishes its resources. Accordingly, Figure 
3 adds a basic resource inflow process to the resources-operations causal loop. As resources are 
expended through overhead and operations, this increases the pressure on the organization to 
gather more resources. As this pressure increases, the group seeks out ways to gather resources 
and input them into their overall resources base.  
Figure 3: Resources-Operations & Resource Inflow Loops  
 
Figure 4 expands on the resource inflow loop shown in Figure 3, illustrating the fundraising 
process in greater detail. Whereas the Figure 3 causal loop showed a direct cause and effect 
between the pressure to gather resources and the resource inflow, Figure 4 more accurately 
shows that the amount of fundraising activity an organization undertakes intervenes in this 
relationship. In GSPC’s case, the organization chooses between six basic fundraising activities: 
popular extortion, popular donations, crime, legitimate businesses, high dollar kidnappings and 
ransom, and external support (e.g., from a state or non-governmental sponsor). Economic theory 
indicates that the GSPC will consider the costs of each of these activities when deciding which 
one to undertake.[16] In the model, these costs are represented by variables for risk and ease. 
Risk represents the terrorists’ perception of their chances of getting caught during a particular 
fundraising activity. Ease indicates where each activity ranks on a scale of difficulty.  
 Figure 4: Generic Fundraising Loop  
 
The model treats the ease of each fundraising activity as exogenous to the system. In general, 
the level of effort required to extort, solicit donations, run a business, kidnap, or garner external 
support does not change in Algeria over the life of the GSPC. The same is not true for risk. 
Literature relating to the economics of crime and terrorism informed the authors’ modeling of 
these relationships. In a 1978 study on aircraft hijackings, William Landes showed that the 
number of U.S. hijackings dropped precipitously after the installation of airport metal detectors 
because they increased the risk of capture facing potential hijackers.[17] Thus, governmental 
policies intended to stymie terrorist operations affected the terrorists’ perceived risk. In the GSPC 
financial subsystem model, if the terrorists elect to proceed with a given activity despite the risk, 
they are rewarded with a 100 percent success rate. Thus, in the model risk actually represents 
the deterrent effect of government policies versus any substantive benefit such as capturing or 
killing terrorists.  
In the GSPC financial model, the level of government control represents what other economists 
have called “the government’s allocation of resources to thwart various acts of terrorism.”[18] 
Since high levels of insurgent support decrease the number of government collaborators and 
informants among the populace, the amount of government control at any particular time is a 
function of support for the insurgency. Without collaborators and informants, the government finds 
itself unable to strike out at he insurgents who, like Mao’s fish in the sea, disappear into the local 
population. In the model, this is represented by a support for insurgency factor, a non-
dimensional variable which affects the government’s ability to impose its will. Finally, since 
insurgencies generally enjoy increased support from the people as operations against the 
government increase, the model also accounts for this relationship, as illustrated in Figure 5, the 
Insurgent Support Loop. 
 Figure 5: Insurgent Support Loop  
 
The loop in Figure 5 neglects several dynamics affecting insurgent support and government 
control. Accordingly, Figure 6 expands the causal loop diagram to illustrate several feedback 
loops within the GSPC’s insurgent support system. Note that as support for insurgency increases, 
the government’s desire to quell the insurgency grows. For the sake of simplicity and to aid in 
policy options analysis, however, the authors modeled governmental desire to control the 
insurgency as a direct user input.  
Figure 6 also indicates that while the support for insurgency changes over time as a function of 
insurgent success (the proxy for which is the GSPC’s number of operations against the Algerian 
government), the impact of this success is delayed. Furthermore, certain types of fundraising 
activities negatively influence the level of popular support for the insurgency. For example, as the 
GSPC increases the number of extortions it carries out against the Algerian population, this 
decreases the population’s support for insurgency. This negative effect is also subject to a delay. 
These two delays are not equal, however. Based on previous study of insurgency and 
preferences,[19] the model incorporates a slower increase in support from successful GSPC 
operations and a more rapid decrease in support from extortions. This assumption also holds 
intuitively, as it takes a significant amount of time for an organization to build loyalty among a 
population, but it can squander that social capital rapidly if taken for granted.  
Figure 6: Insurgent Support Feedback Loops and Maslow Coefficient  
 
In addition to these delayed feedback loops, support for insurgency is also a function of various 
social and economic conditions in Algeria. Throughout the 1990s Algeria suffered from a host of 
socioeconomic problems. These included high unemployment, eroding infrastructure, government 
corruption, and inadequate housing, health care, and education.[20] For example, even though 
Algerian unemployment has declined recently as a result of high oil prices, the unemployment 
rate remains at 22.5 percent. In 2005, a United Nations Human Development Report ranked 
Algeria 103 out of 177 countries for health, education, and standard of living.[21] 
To model the relationship between these socioeconomic conditions and support for the 
insurgency, the authors relied on earlier system dynamics techniques used to model Sendero 
Luminoso.[22] These efforts measured popular disaffection as a combination of economic, quality 
of life, social, and moral stocks and flows.[23] For simplicity, the authors aggregated these 
variables into a single Maslow coefficient. A higher Maslow coefficient equates to an overall 
higher level of satisfaction with life among the Algerian population. Thus, increases in the Maslow 
coefficient decrease the willingness of the population to support the insurgency.  
Subsystem Stocks, Inflows, and Outflows  
To determine the precise relationships between variables for each aspect of the GSPC financial 
subsystem these relationships, the authors relied extensively on evidence of GSPC fundraising 
and operations from open-source reporting. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports 
translated from the Algerian media proved especially useful in this regard.  
Resource Stock  
In the model, resources flow into the GSPC’s resource pool from a theoretically endless supply as 
a result of the group’s fundraising activity. To set the initial GSPC resources level, the authors 
considered evidence that the GSPC received seed money from al Qaeda. According to Rohan 
Gunaratna, bin Laden did not approve of the Armed Islamic Group’s (GIA) widespread 
massacring of civilians in Algeria. Accordingly, the Qaeda leader “severed all ties with the GIA 
leadership, denounced [GIA leader] Antar Zouabri, and encouraged Hassan Hattab to break 
away and join the GSPC.”[24] Al Qaeda and the GSPC then entered a mutually beneficial 
financial, logistical, and operational relationship.[25] While the precise amount of seed money al 
Qaeda provided the GSPC is unavailable, another al Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al Islam, received 
between $300,000 and $600,000 in September 2001.[26] Since al Qaeda was in a similar 
financial situation from the end of the 1990s until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the authors 
assumed a similar amount of seed money would have gone to Hassan Hattab to set up the 
GSPC. Thus, the model contains an initial resource value of $300,000 for the GSPC. 
Popular Extortion  
The GSPC relies extensively on extortion of Algerian nationals to finance its activities. Two types 
of extortions exist. First, the GSPC shakes down groups of people either in their villages or by 
setting up illegal roadblocks. Typical of a GSPC shakedown was a May 2006 GSPC raid on a 
café in the town of Ouled Rabah. “Once surrounded, the customers were forced to listen to a 
bloodthirsty sermon” before the terrorists “ordered the targeted people to pay them major sums of 
money.”[27] Similarly, on 22 October 2004, the GSPC ambushed a busload of soccer fans south 
of Algiers.[28] To determine the value of these attacks to the GSPC, the research authors 
considered several factors including Algerian capita gross domestic product (GDP) and cost of 
living. With a per capita GDP of just over $2000 per year,[29] most members of the Algerian 
population spend their monthly income almost immediately in order to subsist. Because few 
Algerians have the opportunity to accumulate wealth, members of the population likely would 
have only around one month’s income (between $100 and $250) on hand at any given time for 
the GSPC to extort. Since the GSPC normally targets between twenty and fifty people during 
each of these attacks, the model determines the earnings from each of these extortions 
stochastically across a normal distribution with a mean of $5000.  
A second type of extortion is GSPC kidnapping of wealthier members of society. For example, the 
group recently kidnapped “the son of an entrepreneur” near the town of Boumerdes. As the 
Algerian press caustically noted, “[t]his kidnapping is not anything alien to the groups from the 
Salafi Group for Call and Combat, which are in the habit of abducting entrepreneurs, 
businessmen, and even their relatives to demand ransoms in exchange for their release.”[30] 
Once again, GDP helps determine the value of these attacks to the GSPC. In Algeria, the richest 
20 percent of the population control 42.6 percent of the wealth.[31] The average per capita GDP 
for this elite group is just under $5000 per year. Since this seemed to be a reasonable amount for 
a ransom demand, the model once again stochastically determines the earnings from kidnapping 
extortion across a normal distribution with a mean of $5000.  
Popular Donations 
While the GSPC forces some Algerians to finance its activities through extortion, a number of 
people voluntarily give their support to the organization. The Algerian press consistently reports 
arrests of individuals for their support of the GSPC. In May 2006, for example, “[a]bout 10 people 
involved in the support activities for the GSPC's armed groups were arrested by soldiers in 
several areas east of Boumerdes.”[32] Also in May 2006, authorities disrupted a “network [that] 
reportedly supplied intelligence and food” to the GSPC in the El-Aouana region.”[33] According to 
the Algerian press, the government has broken up more than thirty such support networks 
comprised of over two hundred people in the Boumerdes region alone over the past two years.[34] 
The amount of money the GSPC receives from the Algerian population is a function of the 
capacity and desire of people to donate to the cause. Wealthy Algerians have the most to lose 
should the GSPC successfully overthrow the Algerian government. Therefore, they are unlikely 
sources of voluntary revenue. Furthermore, empirical data indicates most GSPC collaborators 
support the organization by providing food and shelter. These are relatively inexpensive 
commodities compared to weaponry and ammunition. This suggests popular support from the 
GSPC comes from the poorer segments of the population.  
In the GSPC financing model, revenue from domestic donations is a function of the capacity of 
the poorest 20 percent of the population to donate to the cause. The 6.38 million Algerians in this 
bracket control only 7 percent of the nation’s wealth.[35] After considering cost of living data, the 
authors concluded that there is little Algerian domestic capacity for making donations to the 
GSPC. Lacking significant amounts of disposable income, those who do support the insurgency 
tend to provide food and shelter rather than large monetary donations. To depict this, the model 
constrains the quarterly donation value to a maximum of $100,000. This equates to a donation of 
between one and two cents per quarter from each person in the poorest 20 percent of the 
population.  
Of course, not all of the 6.38 million poorest people in Algeria will donate to the insurgency each 
quarter. Indeed, the number of people willing to donate to the GSPC is a function of the support 
for insurgency factor. Support for the insurgency, in turn, is a function of the Maslow coefficient, 
the success of the insurgency, and its exploitation of the population. As these factors converge to 
raise support for the insurgency, the amount of resources the GSPC will receive from popular 
donations also rises. Conversely, if support for the insurgency decreases, popular donations to 
the GSPC also decrease. To determine the nature of this relationship, the authors turned to a 
RAND Corporation study of insurgent conflict written near the end of the Vietnam War. According 
to the study, the curve representing support for the insurgency “is likely to be ‘kinked’ at both high 
and low [support] levels (because of a shortage of wholly committed, ardent supports at high 
levels, and the ‘bandwagon’ effect at low levels).”[36] Accordingly, the authors modeled the 
domestic donation input to the GSPC as an exponential curve with two “kinks.” The exponential 
shape of the curve accounts for the bandwagon effect. The two “kinks” reflect that no matter how 
high the support for the insurgency reaches, some holdouts will continue to support the old 
regime. Similarly, even if the support for insurgency factor reached zero, population donations 
remain present at a low level, representing the reticence and devotion of the GSPC’s hard-core 
support base. 
Smuggling  
The Algerian GSPC is closely tied to smuggling operations in the Sahel. The main commodity 
trafficking through the Sahara is in cigarettes, “what the Algerians call the Marlborough 
Connection.”[37] According to media reports, U.S. intelligence believes GSPC operations in the 
region are under the command of Mokhtar Benmokhtar. The organization does not actually 
engage in smuggling, however. Instead, “the GSPC has made an agreement with drug dealers 
and tobacco smugglers. The latter give money and fuel to the GSPC, which, in return, guarantees 
a right of passage, and even recommend[s] ways [for] them to escape from the region's customs 
services and security forces.”[38] Other reports indicate that some smugglers share their 
merchandise with Benmokhtar in order to buy his protection.[39] Reportedly, the GSPC uses 
proceeds from cigarette trafficking to purchase weapons from Mali and Niger. These activities 
generally escape detection by authorities since the population of the region is less likely to report 
smuggling than terrorism.[40] 
No firm numbers on the extent of cigarette smuggling in the Sahel region are publicly available. 
Fortunately, it is possible to infer the extent of smuggling through other data. According to the 
World Bank, in 1994, Algerian cigarette consumption totaled over 16.8 billion cigarettes. The 
1997 cost for twenty cigarettes was between 100 and 140 Dinar, or $1.86 and $2.38.[41] 
Combining these two statistics yields a total value for the Algerian cigarette trade approaching 
$1.6 billion. Research has shown a loose correlation between the amount of cigarette smuggling 
in a country and Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index.[42] Algeria’s 
transparency index is 2.8,[43] which suggests approximately 17 percent of the total cigarette 
industry is dependent on smuggled goods.[44] This equates to approximately $275 million dollars 
of cigarette smuggling per year.  
It is highly improbable that the GSPC is able to tax the totality of the Sahel based “Marlboro 
connection.” The Sahel is a vast and expansive desert region. The Algerian government has 
difficultly establishing control over this area even with all the resources of the nation-state. The 
GSPC, with its limited membership, certainly has much less capacity to do so. Accordingly, the 
model assumes GSPC is only able to tax 10 percent of this smuggling operation per year. This 
yields $2.75 million dollars worth of smuggling available for exploitation by the GSPC each year.  
Unfortunately for the GSPC, Belmokhtar is widely seen as an individual now motivated more by 
money than ideology. As one expert noted, he “no longer [has] anything to do with a political 
project, it is almost a way of life; it is basically criminal banditry.”[45] To account for Belmokhtar’s 
pecuniary motivations, the authors modeled a 30 percent skimming factor. While this factor is 
comparable to skimming reported from GSPC fundraising operations in Europe,[46] the authors 
suspect it is conservative with respect to the rapacious Belmokhtar.  
Business Fronts  
GSPC operatives are suspected of running several legitimate businesses in Algeria. Although 
one report suggests the GSPC uses a travel agency as a business,[47] open-source reporting 
has limited details on this GSPC financing stream. Despite this dearth of unclassified data, most 
terrorist organizations do use business fronts to increase their resource base. Legitimate 
business operations are attractive because of their low risk and reasonable potential returns.[48] 
The model reflects this characterization of legitimate business by assigning a lower risk and 
greater ease for terrorists to engage in this financing activity compared to other fundraising 
methods.  
High Dollar Kidnappings and Ransoms  
High dollar kidnappings and ransoms are a significant source of revenue for the GSPC. While the 
model’s extortion module accounts for some kidnappings, it does not include high dollar ransoms 
paid by the extremely wealthy due to several qualitative differences. First, the amount of ransom 
is orders of magnitude above those paid by the normal populace, ranging from one-hundred 
thousand dollars into the millions. Second, high dollar kidnappings are few and far between. 
Indeed, only three high dollar kidnappings and ransoms have been reported. In February 2003, a 
GSPC group operating in southern Algeria kidnapped thirty-two European tourists. The GSPC 
only released the hostages after Germany paid a reported six million dollar ransom to the 
group.[49] The other two have occurred more recently. In April 2006, the GSPC kidnapped an 
entrepreneur in Boumerdes, reportedly demanding “eight hundred million centimes 
[approximately $100 thousand] for his release.”[50] In May 2006, the GSPC released the brother 
of the Haddad Company’s chief executive officer. His abductors “had demanded 250 million 
dinars [approximately $3.4 million] in exchange for his release.”[51] 
As a one time event, the GSPC’s kidnapping of European tourists appears to be an operation of 
opportunity. A GSPC defector claimed that the “decision to kidnap [the European tourists] was 
made spontaneously” during a routine extortion roadblock.[52] Initially, the GSPC let the tourists 
pass, intending only to follow them to their base camp in order to steal their Toyota vehicles. Only 
the next morning, after finding the tourists had only one Toyota and several motorcycles, did the 
GSPC decide to ransom the tourists.[53] The two more recent attacks on wealthy Algerians may 
be part of a larger trend, but the data is inconclusive. Therefore, the model includes a high dollar 
kidnapping function which the user can enable or disable at different times during the simulation 
in order to replicate the opportunistic nature of these events.  
External Support  
Although the Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting the GSPC,[54] 
there is little evidence that the GSPC is receiving any external aid from either state or non-state 
actors. As mentioned above, sources suspect the GSPC did receive seed money from al Qaeda, 
but continuing support is unlikely given the U.S. attacks on Afghanistan and subsequent 
disruption of bin Laden’s network. More recently, reports surfaced of the GSPC asking for 
assistance from al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). An alleged letter from the GSPC to AQI reportedly 
“pleaded for the help of al-Qaida's chief in Iraq, [the late] Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, following painful 
setbacks.”[55] The letter asked Zarqawi to “support brothers in Algerian jihad groups by making 
sermons that call for defeating the tyrants.”[56] AQI is the current beneficiary of significant sums 
of money flowing from Saudi Arabia.[57] As such, the organization probably could afford to 
provide financial assistance to outside groups. Additionally, AQI has two possible motives for 
assisting the GSPC. First, the GSPC reportedly supports insurgent operations in Iraq by providing 
Algerian suicide bombers.[58] Second, AQI is currently engaged in a power struggle with 
Afghanistan-based al Qaeda elements.[59] Notably, the GSPC vehemently denies having sent 
this letter to Zarqawi.[60] 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence AQI has redirected any of that money to Algeria. Therefore, 
the authors concluded GSPC was not currently receiving significant external support. However, in 
order to assist with later analysis, the authors did include provisions for external support in the 
model. This functionality is disabled in the base model, and the flow of external support to the 
GSPC is set at zero.  
Resource Outflows  
Terrorists must make basic economic decisions with respect to resource allocation. While a 
traditional business markets goods and services in order to meet a profit objective, terrorism 
creates a peculiar commodity (terror or fear) in pursuit of a political objective.[61] In producing 
their commodity, terrorists incur two sets of costs. The first of these is overhead. Typical terrorist 
organization overhead costs equate to somewhere between 70 and 80 percent of their total 
budget.[62] The authors elected to model the GSPC at the efficient end of this spectrum and set 
overhead expenses at 70 percent of the GSPC’s budget.  
The second outflow of GSPC resources derives from operational costs. In 2002 a member of 
Hezbollah “put the figure of a terror attack at $665-$1,105.”[63] Hezbollah operations range from 
simple shootings to bombings, the latter being somewhat more expensive than the former. Since 
the GSPC conducts many more ambushes and assassinations that bombings, its cost per 
operation is likely to be at the low end of the Hezbollah estimate. Thus, the model determines the 
cost per Algerian operation stochastically across a normal distribution with a mean of $700.  
European Fundraising and Operations  
The operational scope of the GSPC extends beyond the borders of Algeria. Evidence suggests 
the GSPC has formed cells in France, Italy, Spain, and Britain.[64] Indeed, by 2000 the GSPC 
had displaced the GIA throughout the Algerian Diaspora in Europe.[65] Since that time, 
authorities have arrested numerous terrorist operatives and disrupted several GSPC terrorist cells 
across Europe.[66] Most recently, Swiss police arrested seven suspected GSPC members 
allegedly plotting an attack on an El Al Airliner.[67] 
Three sources comprise the bulk of GSPC’s European fundraising. First, Mohamed Sifaoui, an 
Algerian-born French journalist, infiltrated a GSPC fundraising cell that skimmed zakat donations 
to fund terrorist operations.[68] Second, disenfranchised Algerian youth engage in petty crime, 
including “car theft, credit-card fraud, and document forgery; and their earnings [are] channeled to 
finance terrorist activity.”[69] Finally, an unknown amount of money is knowingly donated to the 
GSPC.[70] 
As depicted in Figure 7, the authors modeled European GSPC finances and operations using 
logic similar to that applied to the organization’s Algerian operations. European resource inflows 
include skimming from zakat contributions, petty crime, and voluntary donations. Since Sifaoui 
witnessed skimming during his infiltration of the GSPC, the amount reaped from zakat is reduced 
by 30 percent.[71] European resource outflows include cell sustainment and terrorist operations 
costs. Cell sustainment is the first priority, and money that is leftover is used for terrorist 
operations in Europe.[72] Excess money is then funneled to support the GSPC’s Algerian 
insurgency.[73] 
Figure 7: European Operations 
 
Modeling Results  
Producing a working system dynamics model is only the first of many steps in the modeling 
process. A robust validation and verification is required to assess the model’s fidelity. 
Furthermore, sensitivity analysis helps reveal the usefulness of the model for performing policy 
options analysis. Whether accurate or not, models that are overly sensitive to changes in initial-
conditions or relationships between variables have limited utility. Following a robust validation, 
verification, and sensitivity analysis, policymakers know the full range of a model’s strengths and 
weaknesses and can use the model to help them assess various courses of action.  
Validation and Verification  
To facilitate validation and verification, the authors ran the GSPC financial subsystem simulation 
twenty times under baseline conditions. Each run examined the eleven year period from 1999 to 
2010. Overall, behavior of the GSPC financial subsystem model seems to comport with reality. 
Simulation results suggested the GSPC receives most of its income from smuggling, followed by 
extortions, donations, and business fronts. These results match available empirical data. Similarly, 
the model appears to accurately portray GSPC strength over time, extortion activity, Algerian and 
European operations tempo, and high dollar kidnappings.  
GSPC Strength over Time  
Simulation results showed an overall decline in GSPC strength over time, as measured by the 
level of support for the group among the Algerian population. This decline of popular support for 
the GSPC appears to mirror reality. Unfortunately, no quantitative data on the Algerian 
population’s support for the insurgency is available. However, according to Professor William B. 
Quandt of the University of Virginia, Islamists currently enjoy the support of around 20 percent of 
the Algerian population. Furthermore, support for Islamist terrorism has been in steady decline 
since the late 1990s.[74] Other experts confirm that the current state of popular support for the 
GSPC is low, although quantifying the level of support remains difficult.[75] 
As expected, once the GSPC exhausted its initial seed money and started extorting, support for 
the organization dropped. Interestingly, after support dropped during simulation, the GSPC 
decreased its extortion activity and focused instead on operations against the Algerian 
government. This action should have bolstered support for the insurgency among the populace. 
However, the degree to which the GSPC decreased its extortion activity during simulation never 
reached the point where it reversed the overall decline in popular support over time. 
Extortions  
Data on the GSPC’s extortion activity tracks closely to the results from simulation, as seen in 
Figure 8. For example, in 1999, the GSPC executed few extortions of the populace, but the 
number spikes to over twenty in 2001. Subsequently, the number of extortions drops again in 
2002. This pattern is repeated over the next few years. Extortions increase slightly in 2003, 
followed by a decrease in 2004 and a spike of just over ten extortions in 2005. During simulation, 
the number of GSPC extortions exhibited similar behavior, spiking and declining during alternate 
years. However, the model’s extortions input comes from spikes of over thirty extortions per year. 
This is a significantly higher frequency than the number reported in the open press. Although this 
discrepancy could be a consequence of an inaccurate assumption in the model (e.g., a 
pessimistic earnings per extortion), it might also result from inaccuracies in the validation 
database. Truth data on the number of extortions is derived from FBIS open source reporting. 
Accordingly, the discrepancy between reported and simulated extortions could indicate an under-
reporting of extortions in the open press. This scenario seems plausible, given that many of the 
GSPC’s extortions are of the relatively poor in rural parts of Algeria. 
Figure 8: Extortions per Year 
 
Algerian Operations  
The number of GSPC operations against the Algerian government is close to the output from the 
simulation. As shown in Figure 9, data from open sources indicates a median attack frequency of 
just over thirty-five per year. The simulation produced similar results, with a median attack 
frequency between 8 and 12 attacks per quarter, depending on the run. One notable discrepancy 
exists between simulation and real-world data, however. The model predicts a higher number of 
attacks per year, steadily declining, for the first three years of GSPC operations. In the model, this 
is a result of the organization using the “seed money” allocated to them from al Qaeda to fund 
operations during the first year. In contrast, real-world data indicate a steadily increasing number 
of attacks between 1999 and 2001. As before, this discrepancy might be the result of inaccurate 
reporting. A known bias in the open press is that it attributed several GSPC attacks to the GIA 
prior to the former organization gaining notoriety. An alternative but less likely hypothesis is that 
the existence or amount of the $300,000 al Qaeda seed money in the model could be inaccurate. 
Figure 9: Total Attacks of Government Targets 
 
European Operations  
The model’s simulated results for European operations are consistent with observed patterns. 
Unfortunately, however, data for a full validation and verification are not available. Simulation 
resulted in the GSPC conducting an average of 1.75 attacks in Europe per year, or seven attacks 
every four years. This is consistent with the eight reported GSPC-planned attacks in Europe from 
1999 to 2006.[76] Additionally, the model suggested the amount of money flowing from Europe to 
Algeria is approximately $37,000 per quarter, or $148,000 per year. Regrettably, no data on the 
precise flow of GSPC funds from Europe to Algeria is available to validate and verify these results. 
Still, simulation results qualitatively match the aggregate of expert opinion, which suggests most 
money raised in Europe is spent in Europe and very little is sent to Algeria to support the 
insurgency.  
High Dollar Kidnappings  
When the model’s high dollar kidnapping functionality was enabled, the simulated GSPC would 
perform one of these attacks relatively infrequently, with the timing of the event determined 
stochastically against a target of opportunity. Analysis of simulation results indicates that following 
a high dollar kidnapping authorities can expect a significant increase in operations against the 
Algerian government. During simulation, the spike in Algerian operations was proportional to the 
amount of money received from the kidnapping. Additionally, simulation showed a temporary 
three quarter lull in GSPC extortion activity. Truth data on operations against the Algerian 
government are shown in Figure 10. As mentioned above, in February 2003 the GSPC captured 
32 European tourists in the Sahel. Reportedly, the German government paid a 5.5 million Euro 
ransom in August 2003.[77] Although there is an increase in the number of operations against the 
Algerian government following the ransom payment, the intensity of the increase during 
simulation was much greater. Whereas truth data indicated operations against the government 
spiked to just under 20 per quarter, simulation suggest the number would be closer to fifty such 
attacks.  
Figure 10: Quarterly Operations against the Algerian Government 
 
The authors investigated two hypotheses to explain this discrepancy. The first hypothesis was 
that the real-world operations did not increase at the same rate as in the model because the real 
world the kidnappers took an extensive cut of the profit. The available evidence disproves this 
hypothesis. A GSPC defector reported that Abderrazek al Para, the GSPC Emir from zone 5 
responsible for the kidnapping, paid his men a paltry bonus of only 300 Euros each.[78] The 
second hypothesis was that the GSPC invested a portion of the windfall from the kidnapping into 
infrastructure or supplies rather than spending it immediately on operations. The evidence 
confirms this is indeed what happened. Defector reporting indicates that al Para disbursed the 
ransom money to four separate groups, tasking each to purchase weapons and ammunition in 
Mali and Niger.[79] The model does not allow for such sophisticated investment patterns.  
Sensitivity Analysis  
In system dynamics modeling, once one appears to have a valid model the next step is to subject 
it to a robust sensitivity analysis. The goal of this sensitivity analysis is to determine to what 
extent the model’s apparently valid behavior depends on assumptions made during its 
construction.[80] In the case of the GSPC financial subsystem model, changes to most 
parameters resulted in predictable and insignificant changes to simulation outcomes. Results 
from the sensitivity analysis on the amount of zakat available for skimming in Europe are 
representative. As the authors increased the GSPC’s ability to skim from zakat, European 
operations and the flow of money from Europe to Algeria increased proportionally. Nonetheless, 
changes to other parameters, including initial seed money, popular ability to donate to the 
insurgency, the level of initial support for the insurgency, and the overhead cost factor yielded 
interesting results worthy of more detailed discussion.  
Initial Seed Money  
Changing the GSPC’s initial seed money significantly affected the life-cycle of the terrorist 
organization during simulation. When the GSPC received less seed money, this caused the 
organization to resort to extortions to raise money sooner, which subsequently decreased their 
popular support level and hastened their eventual demise. Conversely, when the GSPC received 
more seed money, the organization would delay its resort to extortion, thereby extending its life 
span by several years. A high level of seed money allowed the group to focus its efforts on 
operations against the government. When the GSPC’s initial seed money was set at $1 million, 
the organization’s level of popular support actually increased slightly over the first three years of 
its life. Once the GSPC’s declining resources forced it to resort to extortion, however, public 
support began a slow decline.  
Overhead Costs  
Lowering the percentage of resources devoted to overhead costs in the model (i.e., increasing 
terrorist efficiency) resulted in a significant increase in the terrorist organization’s probability of 
success. Since the GSPC required fewer resources for overhead expenses, it could devote more 
of its attention to operations against the government. Reducing overhead costs from 80 percent 
to 50 percent of expenditures resulted in an increased pace of operations against the government. 
This increased operations tempo decreased the rate of decline in popular support for the 
insurgency, but it did not reverse this decline. The organization simply lived longer.  
Popular Ability to Donate to the Insurgency  
Changing the ability of the population to donate to the insurgency revealed an interesting effect. 
Although decreases to the popular ability to donate forced the GSPC to resort to extorting the 
population slightly earlier, this did not significantly reduce the GSPC life-cycle. On the other hand, 
increasing the population’s ability to donate in the simulation had significant benefits for the 
GSPC. Increasing popular donation capability from $100 thousand per quarter to $1 million 
significantly delays the GSPC’s demise. If the popular donation capability is raised high enough 
(e.g., by another order of magnitude), the GSPC actually increases in strength over time.  
This result has significant policy implications for the Algerian government. Foremost, it indicates 
that improving the economic conditions of the poorest in Algerian society has the potential also to 
improve the GSPC’s economic conditions. This contradicts the notion that improved economic 
conditions can, by itself, starve an insurgency of support. Instead, analysis suggests the Algerian 
government will only see its position improve with respect to the insurgency if the people see the 
government as responsible for the improved economic conditions (and improved satisfaction with 
life in general). This requirement calls for robust propaganda aimed at giving the government 
credit for any improvement in economic conditions, thereby increasing the population’s 
satisfaction with life and insulating them from the insurgency.  
Initial Support for the Insurgency  
Changing the initial support for the insurgency has an effect similar to changing popular donation 
capability. The baseline model sets the popular support coefficient at 0.25, representing popular 
support for the GSPC from 25 percent of the population. Decreasing popular support prior to 
running the simulation also decreased the amount of money the GSPC gained through voluntary 
donations, leading the organization to resort to extortions sooner. This caused the organization’s 
support to spiral downward, resulting in an early end to the GSPC as a viable entity. Conversely, 
increasing the level of support prior to simulation extended the GSPC’s life. For example, if the 
GSPC’s initial popular support level is set to .75, the organization actually increases in strength 
over time. Fortunately, the evidence indicates it is unlikely any Islamist insurgent group ever will 
enjoy much greater than 25 percent support among the Algerian populace.[81] 
European Operations  
Throughout the sensitivity analysis little changed with respect to European operations. Indeed, 
because Algerian and European operations appear somewhat independent, it is likely that if the 
Algerian GSPC is totally defeated, European elements of the organization will spin off on their 
own. In such an event, the European element of the GSPC would be able to collect and invest its 
excess funds rather than funnel them to Algeria. As this resource base increased, the model 
suggests authorities should expect a corresponding increase in the frequency and severity of 
terrorist operations in Europe.  
Policy Options Analysis  
To assess the impact of various governmental policy combinations, the authors manipulated 
various governmental controls in the model. These included the Algerian government’s desires to 
control extortion, smuggling, business fronts, and operations as well as the level of European 
government control over terrorism. Additionally, the authors assessed how changes to the 
Maslow coefficient and external support affected simulation outcomes.  
Algerian Government Controls  
If the government of Algeria focuses its efforts on stopping GSPC extortion of its population, the 
results may backfire. If the government succeeds in stopping the GSPC from extorting the 
population, this has the unintended side effect of arresting the decline of GSPC support. Indeed, 
if the government is able to completely stop extortions, support among the populace for the 
GSPC actually starts increasing (albeit at an extremely gradual rate). 
Instead of attempting to stop extortions, the Algerian government should focus its efforts on 
attempting to control smuggling. The government receives two benefits from this approach. First, 
since smuggling operations are the most lucrative fundraising source for the GSPC, cracking 
down on them forces a decline in GSPC operations against the government. Second, the GSPC’s 
declining in revenue after the government crackdown forces the organization to maintain a high 
level of extortion operations. This, in turn, decreases popular support for the insurgency over time. 
A similar government crackdown against GSPC-affiliated businesses had less of an effect. 
Although simulation showed the government could decrease the GSPC’s business front revenue 
by nearly 50 percent, this has a negligible effect on the larger system. Ultimately, GSPC revenue 
from legitimate business fronts is marginal compared to other sources of income. Thus, all else 
being equal, the government should apply its resources against more lucrative GSPC funding 
streams, the most lucrative being Sahel smuggling.  
As an alternative to the policy of cracking down on GSPC fundraising methods, the Algerian 
government could crackdown on GSPC attacks against the government itself and its agents. In 
general, this policy appears more beneficial to the government than attacking GSPC sources of 
income. A simulated government crackdown on these kinds of GSPC operations decreased the 
number of attacks by half, with substantial benefits. After the government crackdown, support for 
the insurgency among the populace began to steadily decrease.  
Maslow Coefficient  
Governmental policies (or lack of policies) that increase or decrease the level of satisfaction felt 
by the population have a significant effect on the outcome of the insurgency. A satisfied populace 
will tend to view the government as legitimate, and, all else being equal, be less inclined to 
support the insurgency. Conversely, if popular disaffection increases over time, there is a 
corresponding increase in support for the insurgency. During simulation, this increase in support 
was self-reinforcing over time. As increased GSPC revenue from donations decreased pressure 
on the organization to extort from the population, its support level spiraled upward.  
European Government Controls  
The model gives simulated European governments a robust ability to control terrorist operations 
on their soil. If this control decreases (due to a decrease in either European capacity or will), the 
impact on the GSPC system is significant. Predictably, simulation shows that if European 
governments lessen their anti- and counter-terrorism efforts the number of terrorist attacks on 
European soil grows rapidly. Interestingly, however, simulation also suggests that as the GSPC’s 
European cells find themselves more and more able to operate in Europe, they will send less and 
less money back to Algeria. In effect, if the Europeans allow the GSPC to operate under less 
pressure, the European GSPC is likely to schism (formally or informally) from its Algerian parent 
and create an independent organization.  
External Support for the GSPC  
The GSPC does not currently enjoy significant external support. Most of the worldwide supply of 
money supporting jihadist causes is flowing to support al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). If the Iraqi situation 
is resolved somehow and the money previously flowing to support AQI becomes available to the 
GSPC, the consequences would be significant. An infusion of external support of only $100 
thousand per year is enough to allow the GSPC simultaneously to increase its operations against 
the Algerian government and decrease its fundraising efforts. These two immediate effects 
reverberate through the system, ultimately resulting in a gradual increase in the level of popular 
support for the insurgency. Thus, it is imperative policymakers do as much as possible to prevent 
the diversion of external support to the GSPC.  
Conclusion  
In developing the GSPC financial sub-system model, the authors capitalized on the advantages 
of systems dynamics modeling while remaining cognizant of the method’s shortcomings. The first 
advantage of the system dynamics approach is that it provides the opportunity to perform robust 
quantitative analysis. Second, the systems dynamics approach allows examination of system 
performance over the entire course of a specified time period. The user is not limited to analyzing 
a single snapshot in time. Third, systems dynamics modeling allows for (and often depends on) 
the incorporation of expert opinions. Aggregating multiple and contradictory opinions on a 
system’s performance improves the definition of system boundaries. Finally, modeling affords the 
analyst the ability to analyze multiple relationships among system variables, freeing the user from 
normal cognitive limitations.  
Despite these methodological strengths, using a systems dynamics approach to characterize the 
GSPC financial sub-system presented three main challenges.[82] First, the authors sought to 
create a model that could produce results policymakers could quickly and easily comprehend. 
The main vehicle for accomplishing this objective was the incorporation of a graphical user 
interface (GUI). The GUI provides a straightforward means of manipulating parameters, 
distancing the user (e.g., policymaker) from the inner workings of the model. Additionally, the 
interface provides pre-defined output graphs designed to display the most useful system behavior 
information using the smallest possible number of variables. Second, the authors had to avoid the 
tendency to over-generalize the model. This tendency usually results in a product applicable to a 
range of similar systems, but incapable of reflecting the nuances of the targeted system. While 
the approach used to develop the GSPC financial subsystem model may be valid for other 
terrorist organizations, the model itself is specific to the GSPC. Attempting to apply the model 
without modification to other terrorist organizations will yield invalid results. Finally, the authors 
had to avoid the tendency to model only portions of the system for which robust data existed. 
Disciplined reliance on expert opinion, diverse data sources, and parameter bounding techniques 
helped the authors overcome this proclivity.  
Despite the authors’ best efforts, the GSPC financial sub-system model has both strengths and 
weaknesses. Strengths include the model’s level of complexity, stochastic functionality, and 
incorporation of delays. Weaknesses inherent in the model are its exclusive focus on the financial 
subsystem, limited data availability for building assumptions, and an incomplete modeling of 
system drivers.  
While simplicity was the goal, as the model design process progressed it became evident that 
some level of complexity was necessary and beneficial. The complexity became necessary in 
order to accurately describe the numerous GSPC funding sources. Each point at which another 
component or financial source was incorporated into the model, the complexity increased 
proportionally. Nonetheless, the authors felt capturing these dynamics was important to ensure 
the model’s fidelity. In the end, the level of complexity incorporated into the GSPC financing 
model enabled higher quality descriptive analysis despite limited data availability.  
To offset the need for increased complexity, the authors constructed the GSPC finance model 
using a modular approach. Each GSPC fundraising technique has its own module, and all feed 
into a core stock. Additionally, support for insurgency, strategic operations, and European 
operations all reside in their own modules. This modularity provided enhanced flexibility and 
allowed the authors to make changes to individual components of the system throughout the 
project. This modularity also facilitated efficient sensitivity and policy options analyses.  
In order to better replicate reality, wherever possible the model avoids the use of discrete 
numerical values and instead relies on stochastic inputs (e.g., distribution functions) to account 
for variable uncertainty. For example, the amount of money obtained from a fund-raising 
operation is not always a fixed value. Using available open-source data and a degree of logical 
reasoning, model uses distribution functions to represent the spectrum of possible values for 
resource inputs and outputs.  
In another attempt to make the model more realistic, the model incorporates a number of timing 
delays. Evaluations of system dynamic modeling within the social sciences commonly include the 
critique that models lack adequate consideration of the inherent delays in the targeted systems. 
Indeed, the impact from certain variable and/or feedback loops is seldom immediate. For example, 
although atrocities against civilians will decrease public support over time, the result is not 
immediate. Similarly, once an organization decides to undertake a fundraising activity, the inflow 
of funds takes some discrete amount of time. The GSPC financing model incorporates delay 
functionality in both of these cases, as well as several others where appropriate.  
Despite these strengths, there are three significant shortcomings to the model. First, the model 
focuses exclusively on one subsystem among many that make up the composite GSPC system. 
While the authors contend the model has significant stand-alone value, its value would increase 
significantly with the addition of other subsystems. The most significant omission in the current 
model is the lack of consideration of organizational size. Incorporating recruitment, total 
membership, and attrition into the model would greatly enhance its value.  
The second shortcoming is the lack of available data for assumption building. This shortcoming 
was imposed on the model due to the fact that the GSPC is not as well researched as other 
terrorist organizations. For example, the organizational structure and financial aspects of al 
Qaeda are extensively documented, producing a level of data well above that available on the 
GSPC. Data for this project came primarily from the academic literature, expert interviews, and 
open source reporting. These provided adequate insight into GSPC organizational size, 
objectives, and fundraising methods. Absent in the data were specifics on GSPC operating costs, 
operations expenditures, and specific amounts of money received from various fundraising 
operations. The authors had to infer the parameters for each of these variables through analysis. 
This analysis relied on information from expert interviews, data from other terrorist groups, 
theories of insurgent operations, polling data, and available economic statistics.  
Finally, the model fails to account for a comprehensive list of system drivers. Numerous factors 
influence the level of popular support for insurgencies. A partial listing of these factors reveals the 
underlying complexity of this dynamic. Socioeconomic conditions, availability of public goods and 
services, level of dissatisfaction with current political structures, popular ability to participate in the 
political process, legitimacy of the government, and tactics used by the insurgent group all 
interact to determine the level of popular support for the regime and the rebellion. To prevent 
spiraling complexity, the present model incorporates a single user-adjustable variable to 
represent multiple system drivers and their combined effects. While this helps maintain simplicity 
and parsimony, it also significantly truncates the level of feedback within the system.  
These various strengths and weaknesses of the GSPC financial subsystem model lead to three 
primary suggestions for future research. First, this project was confined to the financial aspects of 
the GSPC. Future efforts should incorporate other GSPC subsystems. Most importantly, 
organizational size has a significant impact on both the financial status and overall success of the 
GSPC. Evidence suggests direct ties between the GSPC’s recruiting and finance functions. For 
example, the organization has been known to require new members to pay a fee to cover initial 
ascension costs.[83] Additionally, as organizations grow, they incur additional overhead expenses 
and are capable of conducting an increased number of operations. Second, the authors 
recommend a social network analysis on the players within the GSPC system. While this would 
clearly characterize the overall system, it would also suggest how the organization moves its 
money internally. Most GSPC monetary transactions involve cash couriers. Thus, social network 
analysis would shed further light on the GSPC’s fiscal structure, particularly with respect to how 
the organization disburses its funds for overhead and operational expenses. Third, the authors 
recommend incorporating a more robust set of system drivers. This effort should follow the 
example set by Thomas, Kiser, Casebeer, and Bartolomei in their work on Sendero Luminoso.[84] 
While the model developed during this project would benefit from these additional research efforts, 
it has already shown itself to have heuristic, descriptive, and even limited predictive capabilities. 
As such, the model has expanded current understanding of the GSPC financial sub-system and 
its impact on the broader organization. Most importantly, however, modeling results validate the 
systems dynamics approach as a means of studying terrorist organizations. Applying the 
approach to other organizations or other aspects of terrorism research is likely to yield significant 
dividends.  
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